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Abstract:  
Economists and policy-makers have long sought the ideal framework for monetary policy as 
it is arguably one of the most important tools for government to influence the economy. 
Exchange rate and inflation are believed to be the most appealing anchors for providing 
guidance to the conduct of monetary policy and are thus widely used in the real world. Most 
existing studies on the effect of exchange-rate arrangements and inflation targeting on 
economic growth suffer from the absence of a clear counterfactual, rendering it difficult to 
interpret their results. Based on a new classification scheme on monetary policy regimes, this 
paper helps to fill that gap by investigating the effect of monetary policy regimes on growth. 
Our results consistently support that an inflation targeting regime has a positive impact on 
economic growth when compared with an exchange-rate targeting regime. 
 
JEL Classifications: E42, E52, E58, F43 
Keywords: Monetary Policy Regimes; Inflation Targeting; Exchange-rate Targeting; 
Economic Growth 
                                                 
1 Kin-Ming Wong, Department of Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong and Business Faculty, Chu 
Hai College of Higher Education, Hong Kong. Email: arieswong@chuhai.edu.hk. 
2 Corresponding author: Terence Tai-Leung Chong, Department of Economics, The Chinese University of Hong 
Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong. Email: chong2064@cuhk.edu.hk.  
 
2 
 
“In principle, one can only assess the effects of inflation targeting by having a clear 
alternative monetary policy regime as a benchmark. That is, to draw conclusions about 
inflation targeting, one must ask what it is being compared to.” 
 
 
 
Mark Gertler, Comment in Ball and Sheridan (2005) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The modern fiat monetary system requires a nominal anchor to guide the conduct of 
monetary policy. Three nominal variables—exchange rate, monetary aggregate, and 
inflation—are suggested to be the most appealing anchors in the literature3. Exchange rate 
targeting has a great advantage in its simplicity and clarity, which is able to establish the 
credibility of monetary policy in a short time. Fixed exchange rate, on the other hand, 
imposes severe constraints on the ability of monetary authorities to respond to domestic 
shocks and is likely to be a target of speculative attacks. Inflation is a good candidate to guide 
monetary policy in its own right since price level stability is usually agreed to be the most 
important ultimate objective for central banks. Friedman (1968), however, argued that the 
link between monetary policy actions and inflation could be indirect, and targeting inflation is 
“therefore likely to make monetary policy itself a source of economic disturbance because of 
false stops and starts.” Friedman instead suggests the use of monetary targeting but reminds 
that “perhaps, as our understanding of monetary phenomena advances, the situation will 
change.” The situation did change when the relationship between money and economic 
variables became more and more unstable in the later period, creating great challenges to the 
monetary targeting strategy. There is wide agreement about the advantages and disadvantages 
of monetary policy regimes using alternative targets, but there is little agreement on their 
“net” effects in promoting economic growth. 
 
                                                 
3  The three nominal variables are usually mentioned in the monetary policy literature; for example, see 
Friedman (1968), Bernanke et al. (1999) and Mishkin (1999). 
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There is a large literature on the theoretical evaluation of alternative monetary policy rules4, 
but the influence of alternative rules on growth critically depends on the assumptions of their 
effects on the adjustment to shocks and on anchoring the public’s inflation expectations. The 
economic effect of alternative monetary policy regimes is therefore largely an empirical 
matter. Since the validity of seriously pursued monetary targeting strategy in the real world 
has been critically challenged5, the empirical literature is more focused on the economic 
performance of the exchange rate targeting and inflation targeting regimes.  
 
The results on the relationship between economic growth and exchange rate arrangements are 
relatively mixed. Ghosh et al. (2003) and Klein and Shambaugh (2010) report higher 
economic growth for the fixed exchange rate regime. Frankel and Rose (2002) also provide 
indirect evidence that currency union, as the strongest form of fixed exchange rate, could 
promote economic growth through its positive effect on trade6. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2003) and Husian et al. (2005), on the contrary, show that a flexible exchange rate 
arrangement achieves higher growth rate. One of the explanations of the mixed results may 
rest on the evidence provided by Aghion et al. (2009). Their results suggest that a flexible 
exchange rate promotes economic growth only above a certain threshold of financial 
development. 
 
The inflation targeting monetary policy framework has been receiving increasing attention 
since the 1990s 7 . Bernanke et al. (1999) and Mishkin (1999) analyze the international 
experience of several inflation targeting countries using the case study approach and suggest 
that inflation targeting could be an ideal candidate for the modern monetary policy 
framework. Surprisingly, Ball and Sheridan (2005) and Ball (2011) and Walsh (2009) fail to 
reveal any significant effect of inflation targeting regime on growth using either difference-
                                                 
4 Some of these examples include Svensson (1999), Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), and Jansen (2002). 
5 Monetary targeting is said to have been a strategy mostly used in the 1970s. However, many studies, including 
Mishkin (2001), have argued that this strategy was not seriously pursued. Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) and 
Bernanke et al. (1999), on the other hand, suggest that many monetary targeting countries, including the two 
classic examples, Germany and Switzerland, are better viewed as “hybrid” inflation and monetary targeters and 
“distinction between inflation and money targeting is overstated.” Other studies such as Bernanke and Mihov 
(1997) and Clarida et al. (1998) support these views with the estimations of policy reaction functions. 
Identification of the monetary targeting regime in the empirical classification is also rare. For example, Stone 
and Bhundia (2004) only classified 35 country-year observations as money anchor in their 1,353 data. 
6 Indeed, there is large literature on the positive effect of currency union and fixed exchange rate on trade, 
including Rose (2000), Rose and Wincoop (2001), and Klein and Shambaugh (2006).  
7 See, for example, Rose (2007) on durability and exchange volatility, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) and 
Lin and Ye (2007, 2009) on inflation and other studies on economic growth discussed in the paper. 
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in-difference or propensity score matching approach. Unlike the studies on exchange rate 
arrangements, the results of which are mainly based on de facto classification, the evaluation 
of the inflation targeting regime heavily relies on de jure classification using the official 
announcement of inflation target for identification. Several studies in the exchange rate 
literature, including Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger (2005), however, show that policies of many countries in practice may not 
be consistent with their publicly disclosed regimes. The assessment of economic performance 
according to the de jure classification could therefore be misleading. 
 
Existing studies on the effect of exchange rate arrangements and inflation targeting on 
economic growth have one major imperfection—nearly all of them are isolated and separated 
in two areas of literature.8 Research in the exchange rate arrangements literature classifies 
regimes into fixed and floating exchange rate regimes. While a fixed exchange rate is 
equivalent to an exchange rate targeting monetary policy, floating exchange rate is not a well-
defined monetary policy, as suggested by Rose (2011). Similarly, the monetary policy of the 
non-inflation-targeting countries is usually ignored in the inflation targeting literature. As 
commented by Mark Gertler in Ball and Sheridan (2005), the absence of a benchmark with 
clear monetary policy makes assessment of the economic performance of an inflation 
targeting regime difficult to interpret. This isolation and separation, in turn, may be explained 
by the absence of a complete classification of monetary policy regimes9. 
 
This paper examines the effect of monetary policy regimes on economic growth using the 
new classification of Wong and Chong (2014). This contributes to the literature by providing 
a direct comparison of two well-defined alternative monetary policy regimes, namely 
exchange rate targeting, and inflation targeting based on de facto classification. The main 
result of this paper shows that inflation targeting regime, when directly compared with the 
exchange rate targeting regime, reports a positive effect on economic growth. The estimation 
results under an augmented Solow model and other empirical growth models are similar. The 
finding is also robust under various model specifications, various methods to exclude 
outliers, and estimations using instrument variable. 
                                                 
8 Bailliu et al. (2003) is one of the exceptions and will be discussed in a later section. 
9 A “De Facto Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes and Monetary Policy Frameworks” has been included 
in the IMF’s Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, but the classification is only available after 
2001.   
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and classification 
used in this paper. Section 3 presents a first pass of data using the propensity score matching 
approach. Section 4 provides the empirical evidences of the effect of monetary policy 
regimes using a simple augmented Solow model and other empirical growth models in the 
literature. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Data and the Classification of Monetary Policy Regimes 
 
This study covers observations for the 228 countries report of the IMF over the post-Bretton 
Wood period from 1974 to 200910. Most of the economic data come from the databases of 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Penn World Table prepared by Heston, 
Summer and Aten (2012). Data on crisis and schooling year are from the dataset of Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2011) and Barro and Lee (2010) respectively. Following the literature, structure-
adjusted trade openness is captured from the residual of a regression of total trade ratio on a 
set of structural variables. The details of sources and definitions of data are explained in 
Appendix A. 
 
Studies on the economic performance of well-defined alternative monetary policy regimes 
are rare. Most notably, Bailiu et al. (2003) estimate the growth effect of pegged exchange rate 
regime and floating exchange rate regime with a nominal anchor for monetary policy. A two-
step classification is used in their study. Observations with low exchange rate volatility are 
classified as pegged regime in the first stage, and the unclassified observations (i.e., countries 
with floating exchange rate) with a publicly announced nominal anchor in the monetary 
policy are further identified in the second stage. This classification strategy, however, could 
prove challenging for several reasons. First, classification which solely depends on the 
exchange rate volatility may misleadingly group countries with small shocks in a pegged 
regime, as argued by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005). Second, it is also not uncommon 
for inflation targeters such as New Zealand, Finland, and Norway to maintain relatively 
stable currencies with heavy intervention in foreign exchange markets in order to achieve 
stable inflation. These observations are likely to be classified as pegged regime in the first 
                                                 
10 In some cases, the data of a country may not be available since the country does not exist in the entire sample 
period. Out of the 228 countries reported in the list of the IMF, 186 have been classified at least for one period. 
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step of classification. The misclassification of observations with smaller shock and low 
exchange rate volatility achieved by inflation targeting policy is therefore likely to result in 
an overestimation of the effect of pegged regime on growth.11 Finally, the use of a publicly 
announced nominal anchor in the monetary policy in the second step also makes the 
classification for the floating regime with nominal anchor highly de jure. 
 
This paper uses Wong and Chong’s (2014) new de facto classification of monetary policy 
regimes to examine the effect of alternative monetary policy regimes on economic growth. In 
Wong and Chong (2014), country-year observations are grouped into two well-defined 
monetary policy regimes, exchange rate targeting and inflation targeting, according to the 
similarity in the observed volatility of the instrument variable, interest rate and two outcome 
variables, exchange rate and inflation rate using k-means cluster analysis. The inclusion of 
inflation targeting as the alternative policy framework in a simultaneous classification could 
avoid misplacing inflation targeting countries with low exchange rate volatility in the 
exchange rate targeting regime as in the two-step approach. For example, several well-known 
inflation targeters such as New Zealand, Finland, and Norway with heavy foreign exchange 
intervention are correctly classified as inflation targeting regime in Wong and Chong (2014). 
Interest rate, as the main instrument used in monetary policy, is also included in the 
classification to minimize the misclassification of observations with small shocks into either 
monetary policy regimes.12 
 
3. A First Pass at the Data with Propensity Score Matching 
 
This section presents a first pass at the data using propensity score matching method. 
Estimations from simple OLS are also provided for reference. The simple OLS provides a 
naïve comparison between the averages of two monetary policy regimes. Estimation using 
the propensity score matching, on the other hand, uses a control group to mimic a randomized 
experiment. To address the self-selection problem, the treatment group (i.e., the inflation 
targeting regime in this case) is matched to a control group with similar values in a set of 
                                                 
11 Indeed, Bailiu et al. (2003) report a higher growth effect for the pegged regime than floating regime with 
anchor using the mixed de jure-de facto approach (or hybrid mechanical rule used in the paper). This result is in 
contrast to the estimation obtained from a pure de jure approach based on official classification. 
12  The robustness of classification, nevertheless, comes with a tradeoff of a number of inconclusive 
observations. 
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control variables. In practice, a propensity score based on the probability of policy adoption 
estimated from Probit or Logit model is used for the matching. In this sense, propensity score 
matching method provides a more reasonable comparison for the economic performance 
between two monetary policy regimes.  
 
 
 
Table 1. Probit Regression Results for Inflation Targeting Regime 
 Dependent variable: Dummy for Inflation Targeting 
 (1) (2)    
Real GDP (in log) -0.126*** 
(0.034) 
0.236*** 
(0.089)   
 
Trade openness -1.218*** 
(0.300)
-0.009 
(0.008)   
 
Trade concentration -0.353 
(0.363)
0.002 
(0.010)   
 
Capital openness -4.206*** 
(0.951)
-8.111*** 
(2.939)   
 
Years in office -0.029*** 
(0.007)
-0.024 
(0.021)   
 
Advanced Country 1.710*** 
(0.179)
2.063*** 
(0.468)   
 
Emerging Country 0.890*** 
(0.160)
0.762** 
(0.389)   
 
      
N 2,516 411    
Pseudo R2 0.229 0.193    
      
All regressions include an intercept and year dummies. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 1 presents the typical estimations of the probability of inflation targeting adoption on a 
set of variables estimated by Probit model using short-run (column 1) and long-run data 
(column 2).13 The set of variables used for estimation follows Wong and Chong (2014), 
which in turn adopts the theory-based variables suggested in Levy Yeyati et al. (2010). 
Unsurprisingly, the results in Table 1 are similar to Wong and Chong (2014) and mirror the 
results in Levy Yeyati et al. (2010). Inflation targeting is more likely to be adopted by 
countries with larger economic size, less open to both trade and capital flows, and weaker 
governments, which make it more difficult to sustain a pegged exchange rate under 
speculation. Advanced countries are also more likely to target inflation. One of the possible 
explanations is that advanced countries may have more favorable institutional factors such as 
central bank independence and transparency to implement the inflation targeting framework. 
 
Table 2 presents the comparisons of short-run and long-run economic performance using 
simple OLS and propensity score matching method. The short-run performance is estimated 
with annual data, while the long-run performance uses five-year averages of non-overlapping 
periods. Differences between the two monetary policy regimes are expected and highly 
consistent in the short-run and long-run data. Inflation targeting regimes report lower 
inflation and inflation volatility on average, even after removing the high inflation 
observations. This, however, comes with a cost of higher nominal exchange rate volatility. 
Overall, the treatment effect of inflation targeting regime is positive on the economic growth 
and negative on the volatility of economic growth. Unlike the simple OLS estimations, the 
treatment effects on most economic variables estimated with the propensity score matching 
approach are not statistically significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 In practice, a separate Probit model is estimated depending on the data availability of the variable under 
evaluation. Estimations presented in Table 1 are for economic growth. For short-run data, dummy for inflation 
targeting equals to 1 if a country-year observation has been classified in the inflation targeting regime in Wong 
and Chong (2014) and 0 otherwise. For long-run data, dummy for inflation targeting equals to 1 if a country has 
been classified as inflation targeting over half of the non-overlapping five-year period and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 2. Inflation Targeting versus Exchange Rate Targeting Regime 
Treatment Group: Annual Data 5-year Averages 
Inflation Targeting 
Regime 
Simple OLS Propensity 
Score Matching
Simple OLS Propensity 
Score Matching 
Economic growth 0.546*** 
(0.209)    
0.242    
(0.331)    
0.593**  
(0.240)   
0.208    
(0.434)    
Economic growth 
volatility   
-1.381*** 
(0.236)   
-0.109    
(0.347)    
Inflation -31.202*** 
(10.611)    
-50.915**  
(20.193)   
-50.023*** 
(18.538)   
-95.205**  
(39.808)    
excluding 
inflation > 40% 
-0.300    
(0.323)    
0.252    
(0.576)   
-1.404**  
(0.672)   
-0.872    
(1.448)    
Inflation volatility   -66.695**  (28.74)   
-80.140    
(49.637)    
excluding 
inflation > 40%   
-1.873*** 
(0.486)   
-0.733    
(0.866)    
Nominal exchange 
rate volatility 
0.205*** 
(0.110)    
0.372*   
(0.221)   
-0.187    
(0.214)   
0.301    
(0.393)    
     
Results of propensity score matching method are estimated with the nearest neighbor matching replacement. 
Standard errors reported for OLS estimations are robust. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
4. Empirical Estimations 
 
4.1. A Simple Solow Model with Monetary Policy Regime 
 
The classic Solow Model provides theoretical support of the use of several fundamental 
variables in explaining the economic growth across countries. The role of monetary policy 
regime in economic growth can be illustrated with a simple Solow model augmenting the 
baseline framework in Mankiw et al (1992). In this model, the production function of an 
economy is assumed to be 
 
Yt = (MtKt)αHtβ(AtLt)1-α-β (1)
 
where 
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tMR
tM   
 
 
and Y is the output, K is the capital, H is the human capital, L is the labor and A is the labor-
augmenting technology. The capital-augmenting factor, M depends on the monetary policy 
regime MR and its marginal effect on capital, θ. In this paper, exchange-rate targeting 
monetary policy regime is taken as the base case for comparison and therefore MR equals to 
zero for exchange-rate targeting regime and equals to one for inflation targeting regime. 
 
Defining k as the stock of capital per effective unit of labor (K/AL), h as the stock of human 
capital per effective unit of labor (H/AL) and y as the output per effective unit of labor 
(Y/AL). The evolution of the economy is determined by 
 
k‧t = skyt – (n+g+δ)kt 
h‧t = shyt – (n+g+δ)ht 
 
where sk is the fraction of income invested in physical capital, sh is the fraction of income 
invested in human capital, n is the growth rate of labor and g is the growth rate of labor-
augmenting technology. The depreciation rate of the physical and human capital is assumed 
to be the same of δ. The motion equations imply the economy converges to a stead state 
defined by  
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and the steady-state output per worker is  
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Finally, the model suggests the growth rate of output per worker is determined by 
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(2)
 
where λ is the convergence rate derived from Taylor approximation around the steady state 
and y0 is the output per worker at an initial state. Using the relationship between M, MR and 
θ, the equation could be rewritten as follow for empirical estimation 
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(3)
 
 
Empirical estimations of the simple augmented Solow model are based on the cross-country 
sample using the average of variables over the period 1974 to 2009. Following Mankiw et al 
(1992), sk is the average share of investment in GDP, the average fraction of the eligible 
population enrolled in secondary school is used as the proxy of sh and the sum of g and δ  is 
assumed to be 0.05. The variable of monetary policy regime, MR is the average of years a 
country implemented the inflation targeting strategy according to the classification of Wong 
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and Chong (2014).  
 
The estimation results are reported in Table 3. Regressions are estimated without any 
restrictions on the coefficients in the first two columns and are estimated with restrictions 
implied by the theoretical model in the last two columns. Results reported in columns 2 and 4 
include additional controls for geographical factors including region, island and landlocked. 
In all cases, the average output per worker over 1970 to 1973 is used as the instrument 
variable for the initial output per worker.  
 
 
 
Table 3. Cross-country Estimation of Solow Model 
 Unrestricted Model Restricted Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Inflation Targeting 0.808** 
(0.401) 
0.790* 
(0.399) 
0.828** 
(0.403) 
0.816** 
(0.392) 
Initial output per worker -0.934*** 
(0.167) 
-0.892*** 
(0.214) 
-0.930 
(0.165) 
-0.926*** 
(0.200) 
ln(sk) 1.453*** 
(0.457) 
1.143** 
(0.505) 
  
ln(sh) 0.811*** 
(0.246) 
0.410 
(0.283) 
  
ln(n+g+δ) -3.23*** 
(0.779) 
-2.812* 
(1.419) 
  
ln(sk) – ln(n+g+δ)   1.515*** (0.449) 
1.201** 
(0.494) 
ln(sh) – ln(n+g+δ)   0.897*** (0.217) 
0.478 
(0.264) 
     
Control for region, island and landlocked No Yes No Yes 
Implied θ - - 1.727 1.973 
Observations used 114 111 114 111 
Adjusted R2 0.373 0.462 0.374 0.464 
   
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Intercept are included in the model but not reported. 
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Results in Table 3 show that the coefficients on the factors suggested in the traditional Solow 
model are highly significant with the predicted signs across estimations. The effect of 
inflation targeting regime on economic growth is found to be significant positive under 
various specifications. In the long-run, inflation targeting regime grows 0.8% faster than the 
exchange-rate targeting regime. In particular, the restricted model suggests that the effective 
capital under inflation targeting regime could be 73% to 97% higher than exchange-rate 
targeting regime. 
 
4.2. Empirical Growth Models 
 
4.2.1. Methodology 
 
To offer greater flexibility in exploring the determinants of economic growth and minimize 
the problem of omitted variables, empirical models are also commonly-used in the 
literature14 . In this section, the effect of monetary policy regime is estimated with the 
following empirical dynamical growth model 
 
 
yi,t – yi,t-1 = (α-1) yi,t-1 + βXi,t + γMRi,t + μt + ηi + εi,t (4)
 
 
where yi,t is the logarithm of output per worker; MRi,t is a dummy for monetary policy regime, 
which equals to 1 for inflation targeting regime; Xi,t is a set of control variables; μt is the time-
specific effect; and ηi is the country-specific effect. To filter out business cycle fluctuations, 
the equation is estimated for the long-run growth at a non-overlapping five-year interval with 
explanatory variables in five-year averages. 
 
The baseline model closely follows Levine et al. (2000) and Aghion et al. (2009) with initial 
output per worker, education, structure-adjusted openness, and government burden included 
as the control variables. Unlike the two studies, inflation is intentionally removed from the 
baseline model since price level stability is believed to be one of the key channels for various 
monetary policy regimes to influence the economic growth. Nevertheless, inflation will be 
                                                 
14 See, for example, Levine and Renelt (1992), Levine et al. (2000), Levy and Sturzenegger (2003) and Aghion 
et al. (2009). 
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included later in an alternative specification.  
 
The dynamic panel data model in equation (4) is estimated with the approach developed in 
Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998) to 
address the endogeneity issue and potential biases induced by country-specific effect. In 
particular, results are estimated using the two-step system GMM approach with the robust 
standard errors suggested in Windmeijer (2005) following Levine et al. (2000) and Aghion et 
al. (2009). The standard instrument set for the system GMM estimation typically grows 
quadratic in time and results in the problem of instrument proliferation. One of the main 
approaches to address this problem is to restrict the instruments to certain lags instead of all 
available lags. This approach is simple, but the number of lags used in instrument set could 
be arbitrary and subjective. Roodman (2009) proposes another approach using a collapsed 
instrument matrix to address the problem. This approach uses all available lags as 
instruments to retain most information. Meanwhile, the instrument set is collapsed into 
smaller set through addition to address the instrument proliferation problem. The baseline 
model is estimated with both approaches, but estimations for alternative specifications and 
robustness tests use the collapse instrument matrix only for brevity. 
 
4.2.2. Estimation Results 
 
Estimations of the baseline model are presented in Table 4. The first two columns report 
estimations of the traditional random effects and fixed-effects models for reference. The 
results of the last two columns are estimated with dynamic panel data model using GMM 
approach. To address the problem of instrument proliferation15, the estimation in the third 
column uses the single lag of the variables as instruments while the estimation in the fourth 
column uses the collapsed instrument matrix approach in Roodman (2009). The GMM 
estimations using both approaches report control variables with expected signs. The main 
results across various estimations of Table 4 consistently show that inflation targeting regime 
has a significantly positive effect on economic growth.  
 
                                                 
15 Empirically, GMM estimation uses the full instrument matrix with all available lags always reporting a p-
value close to 1 in the Sargan test, which is an important syndrome of instrument proliferation. The two methods 
used to control instrument proliferation, on the other hand, are able to address the problem as reflected in the 
Sargan test statistics in Table 4. 
15 
 
 
 
Table 4. Baseline Model for the Growth Effect of Inflation Targeting Regime 
 Panel Data Model GMM: Dynamic Model  
 Random Fixed Single Lag Collapse  
Inflation Targeting 1.08*** 
(0.12)    
0.741*   
(0.449)   
1.21*** 
(0.446)   
0.866**  
(0.442)     
Initial output per worker -0.713*** 
(0.092)    
0.051    
(0.616)   
-0.012    
(0.579)     
Education 0.334*   
(0.190)   
-2.526**  
(1.072)   
0.259    
(0.900)   
0.605    
(0.905)     
Adjusted trade openness 1.798*** 
(0.159)   
4.333*** 
(0.833)   
3.945**  
(1.632)   
3.851*** 
(1.238)     
Government burden -0.193    
(0.160)   
-0.352    
(0.861)   
-3.330**  
(1.511)   
-1.93    
(1.577)     
Financial development -0.390*** 
(0.087)   
-1.312*** 
(0.464)   
0.363    
(0.586)   
0.155    
(0.564)     
      
Observations used 439 439 910 910  
Adjusted R2 0.219 0.103 0.099 0.100  
Sargan test (p-value)   0.161 0.131  
Difference-Sargan test (p-
value) 
  0.921 0.150  
Second-order serial 
correlation (p-value) 
  0.091 0.131  
      
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Year effects and intercept are included but not reported.  
Estimation with random effect also includes dummy variables for region, landlocked, island, and advanced and 
emerging economy which are commonly used in the literature, while the average of output per worker between 
1970 and 1973 is used for the initial output per worker, as in Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). 
Standard errors of OLS estimation are robust and clustered at country level. Standard errors of system GMM 
estimation are robust with Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction. 
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Table 5 reports estimations of alternative specifications with additional variables included in 
the baseline model. The first column includes the crisis variable in Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2011). Unsurprisingly, the crisis variable is found to have a strong negative effect on 
economic growth. This specification, however, comes with the cost of data availability, which 
reduces the observations used for estimation from 910 to 529. The estimation in the second 
column includes the sum of absolute values of inward and outward flows of portfolio 
investments as a ratio of GDP to capture the effect of capital openness on growth. The last 
three columns of Table 5 control the effects of several major channels for monetary policy 
regime to influence economic growth, including price level as well as nominal and real 
exchange rate stability. Consistent with the literature, the results in the last three columns 
show that the volatility of all these variables negatively affects economic growth. 
 
Estimations across alternative specifications in Table 5 report similar positive effects of 
inflation targeting regime on growth and expected variations in the estimated effects. The 
inflation targeting regime, when compared with the exchange rate targeting strategy, is likely 
to suffer from a higher nominal exchange rate. As shown in the third column, the inflation 
targeting regime reports a largest positive effect on growth when its negative effect on growth 
through the nominal exchange rate volatility is controlled. Similarly, this effect is weakest16 
but remains positive when the positive effect of inflation targeting on growth through a more 
stable price level is controlled in the fourth column. The fifth column of Table 5 presents the 
estimation with the effects of both channels controlled through the inclusion of real exchange 
rate volatility. The estimation reports an estimated effect between the two ends. These results 
support that the stability of the target itself is an important channel for monetary policy 
regime to influence the economy. The result in the last column, however, also suggests that 
inflation targeting policy could promote economic growth beyond reducing the inflation 
level. One of the explanations rests on the effect of alternative monetary policy regimes on 
the expectation formation of various economic variables. These expectations, in turn, lead to 
different levels of economic activities contributing to the economic growth.17 
 
                                                 
16 The effect is weakest both economically and statistically, which is marginally rejected at 95% confidence 
level and remains significant at 90% level. 
17 For example, Klein and Shambaugh (2006) also provide evidences that fixed exchange rate promotes trade 
beyond reducing the exchange rate volatility. They suggest that a strong likelihood of a stable exchange rate in 
the near future provided by the presence fixed exchange rate is a likely explanation.  
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Table 5. Growth Effects of Inflation Targeting Regime in Alternative Specifications 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Inflation Targeting 0.833**  
(0.331)    
0.783*   
(0.422)    
1.296**  
(0.577)    
0.662*   
(0.378)    
1.138*** 
(0.398)     
       
Crisis -0.760*** 
(0.236)     
    
         
Capital openness  0.173    (0.206)    
    
       
Inflation    -0.853**  (0.335)      
       
Nominal exchange rate 
volatility   
-0.902*   
(0.531)       
       
Real exchange rate 
volatility   
  -0.976** (0.389)     
       
Observations used 529 621 556 840 487  
       
Sargan test (p-value) 0.646 0.404 0.491 0.299 0.733  
Second-order serial 
correlation  (p-value) 
0.259 0.259 0.208 0.153 0.396  
       
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Results are estimated with all available lags as GMM instruments using a collapsed instrument matrix and 
robust with Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction. 
 
 
4.2.3. Robustness Tests 
 
Table 6 reports the results of various robustness tests on the baseline model. The model with 
the crisis variable, as discussed, comes with a cost of fewer observations but could minimize 
the concern of omitted variables and therefore is also included in robustness tests. The first 
set of robustness tests removes observations in the free-falling category in the Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) classification. The second test applies a similar but stricter principle of free-
falling category to remove all observations with inflation rate higher than 20%.18 The results 
of Table 6 indicate that the effect of inflation targeting regime on economic growth is robust 
to the exclusion of outliers, either using the definition of Reginhart and Rogoff or a stricter 
                                                 
18 The free-falling category in the Reinhart-Rogoff classification is identified with country-year observations 
which have inflation higher than 40%. 
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definition.19 
 
Literature suggests that policy regime is likely endogenous.20 One may therefore argue that 
the relationship between economic growth and monetary policy regime runs from growth to 
policy regime rather than another way round. In the inflation targeting literature, the lagged 
regime variable has been used by Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) to instrument for the 
inflation targeting regime. Ball (2011), however, challenges the use of lagged regime 
variables as instruments since omitted variables in the error term such as central bank 
independence are likely to correlate with both the current and lagged adoption of inflation 
targeting regime. The lagged regime variable therefore is not a valid instrument to address the 
concern on reverse causality. 
 
Estimations with instrument variables are more common in the exchange rate regime 
literature. One of the commonly used variables to instrument for exchange rate regimes is the 
proportion of countries pegging their currency in a region.21 The main rationale is that a 
country is more likely to have its currency pegged to stabilize its currency with neighbors 
when more countries in its region have done so. The adoption of neighboring countries, on 
the other hand, is unlikely to relate to the economic growth of the home country. This paper 
applies the other side of the same rationale to instrument the inflation targeting regime using 
the proportion of countries with exchange rate targeting regime in a region. Given that this 
proportion is positively related to the choice of exchange rate targeting regime of a country, it 
must be negatively related to the adoption of inflation targeting policy. 22  The results 
estimated with this instrument variable are presented in the last two columns of Table 6.23The 
estimations continue to report a positive effect of the inflation targeting regime on economic 
                                                 
19 The baseline estimation on the sample removing the free-falling category fails to reject the null hypothesis of 
the Sargan test and second-order serial correlation test at 10%. It is advisable, therefore, to interpret the results 
with caution. The estimation including the crisis variable on this sub-sample, nevertheless, reports a significant 
coefficient on the inflation targeting dummy and passes the corresponding two tests. 
20 For example, see Levy-Yeyati et. al. (2010), Wong and Chong (2014), Gerlach (1999) and Carare and Stone 
(2006). 
21 For example, see Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), Klein and Shambaugh (2006), and Tenreyro (2007). 
22 In a simple regression, the estimated coefficient of the percentage of countries in a region which peg their 
currencies on the inflation targeting dummy is negative and highly significant with a t-statistics of 18.  
23 The estimations with instrument variables using all available lags as GMM instruments and a collapsed 
instrument matrix fail to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan test and second-order serial correlation test at 
10% as well. Column (5) and (6) are therefore estimated with up to two lags of the possible endogenous 
variables using a complete matrix instead. 
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growth. In particular, the coefficient estimated in the model with the crisis variable is 
qualitatively consistent with the results in other estimations.  
 
 
Table 6. Robustness Tests 
 No free-falling No inflation >20% IV 
 Baseline w/ Crisis Baseline w/ Crisis Baseline w/ Crisis 
Inflation Targeting 0.974*   
(0.541)   
0.800*   
(0.463)   
1.044**  
(0.480)   
1.063**  
(0.432)   
2.177*   
(1.122)   
1.091*   
(0.613)   
       
Crisis  -0.544*   (0.282)   
 -0.700*   
(0.365)    
-0.707*** 
(0.241)   
       
Observation used 834 462 686 400 910 529 
       
Sargan test (p-value) 0.083 0.667 0.117 0.558 0.259 0.622 
Second-order serial 
correlation  (p-value) 
0.064 0.112 0.177 0.174 0.136 0.269 
       
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
All results are robust with Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction. 
Results from column (1) to (4) are estimated with all available lags as GMM instruments using a collapsed 
instrument matrix. Results estimated with IV using all available lags as GMM instruments and a collapsed 
instrument matrix fail to pass the Sargan test. Estimation in column (5) and (6) therefore instrument up to two 
lags using the complete instrument matrix. 
 
 
4.2.4. On Growth Volatility 
 
The result of propensity score matching in Table 2 shows that the inflation targeting regime 
reports lower economic growth volatility but the effect is not significant. Table 7 presents the 
results estimated with a specification similar to the baseline empirical model for economic 
growth. Results of the baseline estimations in the upper panel provide no clear evidence on 
the effect of inflation targeting policy on growth volatility. The results estimated with the 
instrument variable in the lower panel, however, suggest that inflation targeting policy could 
largely reduce the impact of terms of trade shock on economic growth volatility. Based on the 
estimates in the second and fourth columns, inflation targeting policy mitigates about 64% to 
88% of the influence of terms of trade shock on growth volatility. With an average terms of 
trade volatility of 14%, inflation targeting policy could lower the annual growth volatility by 
0.2% to 0.6%. The direct effect of inflation targeting on growth volatility in the absence of 
shock, on the other hand, is not significant. 
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Table 7. Growth Volatility and Inflation Targeting Regime 
 (a) Baseline estimations  
 Random Effect Fixed Effect  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Inflation Targeting -0.357     
(0.295)    
-0.232     
(0.582)    
0.220      
(0.393)    
0.068     
(0.726)     
      
TOT volatility 0.125*** 
(0.029)     
0.129*** 
(0.040)     
0.108*** 
(0.040)    
0.104**  
(0.051)     
      
TOT volatility * Inflation 
Targeting  
-0.130     
(0.054)     
0.017     
(0.064)     
      
Observations used 496 496 496 496  
Adjusted R2 0.356 0.356 0.161 0.161  
      
 (b) Instrument variable estimations  
      
Inflation Targeting -0.671*** 
(0.135)     
-0.074     
(0.272)    
-0.603     
(0.399)    
0.003     
(0.720)     
      
TOT volatility 0.113*** 
(0.015)     
0.131*** 
(0.019)    
0.108*** 
(0.040)     
0.136*** 
(0.050)      
      
TOT volatility * Inflation 
Targeting  
-0.084*** 
(0.026)      
-0.119*    
(0.071)      
      
Observations used 496 496 496 496  
Adjusted R2 0.250 0.227 0.157 0.140  
      
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Year effects, intercept, and other variables in the baseline specification including initial output per worker, 
adjusted trade openness, government burden and private credit are included but not reported.  
Estimation with random effect also includes dummy variables for region, landlocked, island, and advanced and 
emerging economy which are commonly used in the literature. 
Standard errors are robust and clustered at country level. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Monetary policy is arguably one of the most important policies influencing the economy. 
Empirical studies on alternative monetary policy frameworks are not rare, but are isolated 
and separated in two areas of the literature. The absence of a well-defined alternative 
monetary policy regime in the estimations makes the evidence in existing studies less solid. 
Using a new classification of Wong and Chong (2014), this paper offered the first evidence 
for the effect on economic growth of two well-identified monetary policy regimes: inflation 
targeting and exchange rate targeting. 
 
The main result of this paper comes from the empirical estimations of growth model. 
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Inflation targeting is found to have a significantly positive effect on economic growth under 
both an augmented Solow model and other empirical growth models. This conclusion is 
robust across various model specifications and exclusions of outliers. The use of the 
proportion of countries that peg their currency in a region to instrument the adoption of 
inflation targeting policy also provides similar results. On the magnitude of growth effect, the 
estimated coefficients in most models suggest that an inflation targeting regime grows 0.8% 
to 1.1% faster than the exchange rate targeting regime per annum. This magnitude in general 
agrees with some other findings in the related literature24 but this conclusion is more solid 
with a well-defined counterfactual monetary policy in the analysis. 
 
Inflation targeting has been emerging as one of the major monetary policy frameworks and 
receives increasing attention in the literature. Unfortunately, empirical works on the effect of 
inflation targeting policy on the economy usually cover a relatively limited number of 
countries and relatively short periods. Using a classification covering nearly 200 countries 
and a period from 1974 to 2009, this paper offers solid evidence on the growth-enhancing 
effect of this new emerging regime. 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 See, for example, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), who report a negative growth effect of 0.7% to 1.3% 
on fixed exchange rate using the random effect model. Even though the results are not statistically significant, 
Ball and Sheridan (2005) provide an estimated growth effect of 0.7% to 1.9% on economic growth. 
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Appendix A. Data Definitions and Sources  
 
Variables Definitions and sources  
Adjusted trade 
openness 
Residual of a regression of the log of the sum of exports 
and imports over GDP from IFS on the logs of area, 
population, and dummies for regions, island and 
landlocked countries. 
 
Capital openness The sum of absolute value of inward and outward flows 
of portfolio investments as a ratio of GDP (source: IFS)  
Crisis tally Crisis tally in the database from Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2011).  
Economic growth The log difference of real output per worker from 
Heston, Summer and Aten (2012).  
Education Average years of total schooling from Barro and Lee 
(2010)  
Financial development The ratio of domestic credit claims on private sector to 
GDP (source: World Bank).  
Government Burden Ratio of government consumption to GDP (source: 
World Bank)  
Inflation Annual percentage change in consumer price index, 
supplemented with retail price index (source: IFS).  
Nominal effective 
exchange rate 
volatility 
The average of absolute monthly percentage changes of 
nominal effective exchange rates in a calendar year 
(source: IFS). 
 
Population growth 
rate, n Heston, Summer and Aten (2012)  
Real effective 
exchange rate 
volatility 
The average of absolute monthly percentage changes of 
real effective exchange rates in a calendar year (source: 
IFS). 
 
Share of human 
capital, sh 
The percentage of population completed secondary 
education from Barro and Lee (2010)  
Share of physical 
capital, sk 
Investment share of GDP from Heston, Summer and 
Aten (2012)  
Trade concentration The maximum share of total trade to a specific country 
(source: Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF)  
Trade openness The sum of exports and imports over GDP (source: 
IFS).  
Years in office Years the incumbent administration has been in office 
(source: database of Political Institutions 2012)  
   
 
 
